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Abstract 
This project began as an attempt to develop systematic, measurable indicators of bias in written 
forensic mental health evaluations focused on the issue of insanity. Although forensic clinicians 
observed in this study did vary systematically in their report-writing behaviors on several of the 
indicators of interest, the data are most useful in demonstrating how and why bias is hard to 
ferret out.  Naturalistic data was used in this project (i.e., 122 real forensic insanity reports), 
which in some ways is a strength. However, given the nature of bias and the problem of inferring 
whether a particular judgment is biased, naturalistic data also made arriving at conclusions about 
bias difficult. This paper describes the nature of bias – including why it is a special problem in 
insanity evaluations – and why it is hard to study and document.  It details the efforts made in an 
attempt to find systematic indicators of potential bias, and how this effort was successful in part 
but also how and why it failed.  The lessons these efforts yield for future research are described. 
We close with a discussion of the limitations of this study and future directions for work in this 
area. 
 
Keywords: forensic; judgment; report; evaluation; insan*; capital punishment  
  
DISCERNING BIAS IN INSANITY REPORTS  4 
 
Discerning Bias in Forensic Psychological Reports in Insanity Cases 
Researchers’, practitioners’, and legal scholars’ attention has begun to focus on the issue 
of bias in forensic mental health evaluations in the last few years.  Several new empirical studies 
have emerged about these issues (e.g., Murrie, Boccaccini, Guarnera, & Rufino, 2013; Neal & 
Brodsky, 2016; Neal, 2016), as have theoretical papers and reviews (e.g., Murrie & Boccaccini, 
2015; Neal & Grisso, 2014b; Neal, Hight, Howatt, & Hamza, in press).  National funding 
agencies, including the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, have funded several large grants in the last couple of years to further investigate 
these issues, and more empirical research in this area is sure to be forthcoming.   
Nevertheless, much remains unknown about bias in expert judgments, or how bias might 
affect forensic mental health professionals.  This study set out to investigate potential indicators 
of bias in a naturalistic sample of actual forensic reports in insanity cases.  It aimed to advance 
the emerging body of literature about examiner bias by developing and testing how these 
systematic variations might be measured.  Unfortunately, as will be described throughout this 
paper, the link between the behaviors we focused on and “bias” cannot be made based on these 
data. Some interesting and predicted findings emerged, but because ground truth cannot be 
known in our naturalistic sample, inferring bias is problematic.  
Thus, rather than a paper about measuring forensic evaluator bias in insanity cases, this 
paper describes the nature of bias, why it is a special problem in insanity cases, why it is hard to 
ferret out, and documents systemic forensic evaluator behaviors in insanity cases to inform future 
research.  Future work in this area can build on the data provided in this paper about systematic 
evaluator behaviors in an attempt to provide a clearer link between systematic behaviors and bias 
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in order to reduce bias in forensic work.  Most fruitfully, these data might be used in future 
experimental work to better understand and measure bias in forensic work.   
Conceptualizing Bias 
West and Kenny (2011) created an integrative framework for the study of bias and 
accuracy called the “Truth and Bias (T&B) Model” of judgment.  The T&B Model provides 
precise theoretical definitions and parameters for the study of accuracy and bias that can be 
applied widely across different theories of judgment.  It can be used to streamline science’s basic 
understanding of how these constructs operate independent of the researcher’s a priori field or 
theoretical reference point, including forensic psychology. West and Kenny’s (2011) definition 
of bias, which was adopted for this project, is any systematic factor (i.e., not random error) that 
determines judgment other than the truth.   
This basic equation West and Kenny (2011) provided for using the T&B model is J = b0 
+ tT + bB + E, where J is a “judgment” made by a human. T is “truth value,” or the truth 
criterion toward which a judgment is attracted, and t, or “truth force” represents the extent to 
which judgments are attracted toward the truth criterion.  B is “bias variable,” an attractor 
variable that leads to a particular direction on the judgment scale, and b, or “bias force” 
represents the extent to which judgments are attracted toward the bias variable. “Directional 
bias,” or “b0,” is the extent to which judgments are attracted toward a particular end of the 
judgment scale.  
These parameters are useful for the study of bias. However, the value of the input 
variables (i.e., J, T, B) must be known in order to calculate the outputs of interest, like the 
direction and force of bias as relevant to a particular judgment.  Experimental designs might best 
work for using this model.  Given the naturalistic data in the current paper, we did not have the 
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input variables to rely formally on the model, such as a known truth criterion.  Instead, we relied 
on the basic tenets and definitions in the model to frame this work, conceptualizing bias as any 
systematic factor (i.e., not random error) that determines judgment other than the truth.  Future 
experimental work can rely formally on the mathematical model. We now describe particular 
potentially biasing conditions in forensic psychology that could be studied in the context of the 
T&B model. 
Biasing Conditions for Forensic Mental Health Evaluations 
In situations in which decision-making criteria are ambiguous, the potential for bias is 
enhanced (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Murrie & Warren, 2005).  Although some referral 
questions in forensic psychology are fairly well-defined (e.g., diagnostic evaluations, 
competency to stand trial) and have decision-aids that can help the evaluator more easily answer 
the question (e.g., testing materials with explicit decision-rules or actuarial formulas), the nature 
of some referral questions are not so straightforward.  In these types of evaluations, the potential 
for examiner bias is greater.  Insanity referrals are one type of common forensic referral in which 
the criteria for decision-making are more ambiguous than in other types of referrals (Packer, 
2009).  
For an insanity evaluation (also called “criminal responsibility” or “mental state at time 
of offense” evaluations), an evaluator is tasked with reconstructing the thought processes and 
behaviors of the defendant before and during the occurrence of the alleged offense (Melton, 
Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 2007; Packer, 2009).  This reconstructive examination requires 
the examiner to integrate past clinical information and collateral data, a process that often 
requires inference (Packer, 2009).  Furthermore, there are currently no set standards for how 
these evaluations should be conducted or how the report need be structured (Melton et al., 2007).  
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For these reasons, the room for bias is likely greater in insanity evaluations than in more direct or 
structured referral questions.     
In addition to situations where clinical and legal criteria for decision-making are 
ambiguous, the potential for bias is heighted by the adversarial nature of court processes 
(Diamond, 1959; Murrie et al., 2013).  Further, situations in which contextual factors elicit 
strong feelings increase the chances that biases may influence evaluation.  Empirical research 
investigating the impact of attitudes on social behavior indicates that situations in which strong 
feelings are aroused elicit the greatest effects (Cialdini, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1981; Cooper & 
Croyle, 1984).  Because capital punishment is one of the most contentious issues in 
contemporary American society, capital case evaluations may evidence greater bias than other 
types of cases where emotions might be less aroused. 
Evidence of clinician variation in insanity and capital case evaluations. In a series of 
studies, Homant and Kennedy (1986, 1987a, 1987b) showed that a host of subjective factors on 
part of forensic evaluators biased their decision-making processes and conclusions.  Most 
significantly, they showed that evaluators’ political ideology and training were predictive of their 
attitude toward the insanity defense in general, and that this attitude toward the insanity defense 
was predictive of how the experts responded to fixed insanity case vignettes.  Because the 
vignettes were fixed, the variance was attributed to factors that pertained to the clinicians 
themselves rather than to the facts of the case.   
Forensic mental health professionals’ attitudes toward the death penalty have been found 
to impact capital case evaluations.  For instance, evaluators who support capital punishment are 
more willing to take capital case referrals than those who oppose capital punishment (Neal, 
2016).  Furthermore, forensic evaluators who strongly oppose capital punishment are more 
DISCERNING BIAS IN INSANITY REPORTS  8 
 
willing to work for the defense than the prosecution, a “filtering” effect that may lead to 
systematic bias in the justice system (Neal, 2016).  Forensic clinicians who oppose capital 
punishment are significantly less likely to accept a referral for a competency for execution (CFE) 
evaluation (Deitchman, Kennedy, & Beckham, 1991; Pirelli & Zapf, 2008; Susman, 1992).  And 
a recent study shows that forensic clinicians with stronger support for capital punishment engage 
in more moral disengagement, which is in turn associated with greater willingness to engage in 
CFE evaluations (Neal & Cramer, 2017).   
These evaluator attitudes may translate into biased judgments and decisions in capital 
case evaluations.  For example, Deitchman (1991) found that examiner attitude toward capital 
punishment was a significant source of variance in the outcome of a hypothetical (CFE) 
evaluation.  Examiners more favorable toward capital punishment were more likely to evaluate 
the hypothetical death row inmate as competent in a clinically ambiguous case.  Svec (1991) 
found evaluator attitudes toward capital punishment accounted for 8% of the variance in 
participants’ judgments of CFE in fictitious inmates.  Evaluators with negative attitudes toward 
the death penalty were less likely to judge the fictitious inmate as competent.  And Brown (1992) 
also found a significant relation between forensic psychologists’ death penalty attitudes and CFE 
decisions: psychologists who found the mock defendant competent were significantly more in 
favor of the death penalty than those who found the defendant incompetent for execution, F(1, 
308) = 6.35, p <0.01.  
This research suggests that case context and examiners’ personal beliefs may bias their 
interpretation of ambiguous defendant conduct, which has the potential to affect the outcome of 
the case, in capital cases literally having potential life-or-death consequences.  Although the 
literature yields some information on evaluator biases in hypothetical insanity and capital case 
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situations, there is minimal research with examiners regarding possible bias and subjectivity in 
actual insanity or capital case evaluations.  Furthermore, no studies appear to have looked at 
specific evaluator behaviors that might systemically vary in actual forensic mental health reports.   
Behaviors by Forensic Clinicians in Insanity Reports that Might Suggest Bias  
Language.  It has been recommended that forensic practitioners avoid emotionally 
charged and exaggerated language in an effort to maintain impartiality when communicating 
results (e.g., words like “absolutely,” “unquestionably,” “totally,” “incredibly,” “unbelievably” 
Heilbrun, Marczyk, & DeMatteo, 2002).  Such “allness terms” have been identified as a strategy 
of inclusive generalization that may not yield a whole picture.  Overconfidence may also be 
problematic on part of the evaluator, and confidence is not related to accuracy (see Arkes, 1989).  
For instance, statements like “I am certain” may indicate overconfidence, whereas statements 
like “I am reasonably confident” indicate a moderate and more reasonable level of confidence 
(Cramer, Brodsky, & DeCoster, 2009). Just as statements indicating reasonable confidence may 
indicate impartiality on part of the evaluator, the use of qualification terms, such as “however” or 
“nevertheless” (Wagner & Williams, 1961) may indicate the examiner is providing holistic 
information, and therefore may be less likely to have a vested interest in the outcome of the case. 
Examiner conclusions and base rates. A “base rate” refers to the prevalence of a given 
characteristic in a population.  In an examination of 4,498 insanity evaluations, Murrie and 
Warren (2005) found the base rate of clinicians reaching an opinion supporting an insanity claim 
was about 11%.  In their analysis of 5,175 insanity evaluations, Warren, Murrie, Chauhan, Dietz, 
& Morris (2004) found evaluators reached an opinion supportive of insanity an average of 12%.  
Cochrane, Grisso, and Frederick (2001) found that approximately 12% of the 719 federal 
defendants referred for insanity evaluations were found by the evaluator as having an eligible 
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insanity claim.  Warren, Fitch, Dietz, and Rosenfield (1991) examined 894 evaluations with 
insanity as a referral issue, finding that evaluators reached an opinion supporting an insanity 
claim in 8% of cases.  Therefore, the consistent base rate of opinions supportive of an insanity 
defense claim for insanity referrals appears to be between 8-12%. 
Regarding base rates for individual clinicians’ variation in rates of insanity opinions, 
Murrie and Warren (2005) examined 4,498 insanity evaluations that were completed by 59 
clinicians (each clinician had conducted at least 10 of the evaluations).  They examined the 
percent each individual examiner found support for insanity claims.  Although the range was 
between 0% and 50% overall, they found that 85% of clinicians found between 2% to 25% of 
examinees to meet criteria for legal insanity.  They therefore concluded that individual evaluators 
could look to the typical range of 5% to 25% of insanity findings as a base rate to compare rates.  
An examiner finding insanity in substantially more or fewer referrals may be biased in his/her 
decision-making processes.  
Alternative hypothesis testing.  Evaluators should support their opinions with evidence 
throughout reports, but should also provide evidence of testing alternative hypotheses and proffer 
data about these alternatives in the interest of objectivity (Garb, 1998; Neal & Grisso, 2014b).  
Confirmatory bias, a prevalent and problematic human decision bias, is the tendency to seek and 
interpret evidence in ways partial to existing beliefs, hypotheses, or expectations (Neal & Grisso, 
2014b; Nickerson, 1998). If evaluators are overconfident in their initial hypothesis and selects 
only supportive data to consider and report in their decision-making process, they may reach a 
biased conclusion.  This assertion is consistent with motivated reasoning, a social-cognitive 
theory proposing that motivation can affect reasoning through biased cognitive processes 
regarding how information is accessed, constructed, and evaluated (Kunda, 1990). This theory 
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holds that people use the tools of cognition to arrive at desired conclusions, constrained only by 
one’s ability to construct reasonable justifications for that conclusion (Kunda).  Thus, partiality 
may be suggested if psychologists only include information that supports their opinion by 
suggesting the examiner has an interest in a particular outcome of the case.   
Report length. Evidence of bias may be reflected in the length of a report.  Heilbrun and 
Collins (1995) indicated that clinicians who write longer reports are generally documenting the 
bases of their opinions more thoroughly than clinicians who write shorter reports. Those who 
write shorter reports may simply be providing a conclusory opinion without relying on data to 
support their opinion, or they may only be including information that supports their opinion 
without testing alternative hypotheses.  Neal and Grisso (2014a) reported the average length of 
insanity reports was 21.02 (SD = 18.04) pages. Thus, reports that are much shorter than this 
(perhaps just a couple of pages in length) might be insufficiently providing the bases for 
conclusions and opinions.  
Sources of information.  Ethical and practice guidelines for forensic mental health 
reports mandate that examiners cite the sources of information that provide the bases for their 
reasoning and conclusions (American Psychological Association, 2013; Heilbrun et al., 2002). 
Important sources of information for insanity evaluations may include information from past 
mental health records, information about substance and medication use, police and witness 
information about the defendant’s behavior at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant’s 
description of events at the time of the alleged offense, clinical interview and mental status 
exam, and information from professional and non-professional collateral sources (Neal & Grisso, 
2014a; Packer, 2009). If examiners come to a conclusion in an insanity evaluation without basing 
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their conclusions on reproducible data, it may indicate partial processing of information on part 
of the examiner.   
The “Ultimate Issue Issue.” Many legal and behavioral science scholars argue that 
psychologists should not address the “ultimate legal issue” in writing forensic reports (Heilbrun 
et al., 2002; Melton et al., 2007; Morse, 1978).  That is, they argue the categorical legal issue 
should not be addressed (e.g., whether or not the defendant was “sane” at the time of offense or 
whether s/he should be held criminally responsible).  These scholars argue there are strong 
philosophical differences between law and behavioral sciences, and that behavioral scientists 
who have the psychological expertise to inform the legal decision do not have the requisite legal 
expertise to make the ultimate legal decision (American Bar Association, 1989; Insanity Defense 
Work Group, 1983; Fed. R. Evid. 704(b); Melton et al., 2007). Not all forensic psychologists 
agree with this reasoning.  Some argue the ultimate legal question should be addressed by the 
forensic examiner (see e.g., Rogers & Ewing, 1989; 2003), because there is great pressure from 
the court system on examiners to reach the ultimate legal issue in many cases (Morse, 1982; 
Redding, Floyd, & Hawk, 2001; Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper, Wheeles, & Ronan, 2004).   
Regardless of the opinion a particular examiner holds on the issue, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE 404b) prohibits experts from reporting an opinion on the ultimate legal issue in 
insanity evaluations in federal cases, and several states follow suit.  Similarly, the American Bar 
Association’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (2016) recommends that mental health 
professionals not be allowed to offer ultimate opinions in insanity cases.  We coded the extent to 
which examiners reached ultimate opinions as an indicator of certainty, and sought to uncover 
whether a systematic relation exists between how far the ultimate legal question is addressed and 
the other variables outlined above.   
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The Current Project 
This study set out to investigate forensic mental health expert behaviors in a naturalistic 
sample of actual forensic reports.  It aimed to advance the literature by developing and testing 
how these systematic variations might be indexed.  Insanity evaluations were chosen as the 
subject of study because there is no well-defined structure of how the evaluation should be 
conducted or how the report should be written (Melton et al., 2007), yet they are one of the most 
common forensic referral questions (Neal & Grisso, 2014a).  Capital cases were chosen because 
many people - including forensic psychologists - hold strong attitudes about capital punishment 
(Neal, 2016) and their emotions are likely to be aroused in these cases.  The ambiguous and 
emotion-provoking nature of these cases increase the likelihood of finding evidence of 
systematic differences in examiner behaviors to measure.  This study appears to be the first of its 
kind, and thus supplements existing research by exploring what forensic psychologists actually 
do and how their attitudes may leak through in writing forensic reports.   
Hypotheses for the current study.  We generated five sets of hypotheses for this study.  
The first four revolve around the hypothesized relationships among the behaviors described 
above.  The fifth is an exploratory hypothesis about evaluator differences. 
1. We expected that reports with higher rates of emotional words or phrases would be more 
likely to 1a) conclude that an insanity defense is not possible; 1b) be shorter; 1c) include 
fewer sources of information on which conclusions are based; 1d) show less consideration 
of alternative hypotheses; and 1e) address the ultimate legal question more fully.   
2. We expected that shorter reports would 2a) be more likely to conclude that an insanity 
defense is not possible, 2b) include fewer sources of information, 2c) show less 
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consideration of alternative hypotheses, and 2d) address the ultimate legal question more 
fully.   
3. We hypothesized that reports citing fewer sources of information would be more likely to 
3a) conclude that an insanity defense is not possible, 3b) show less consideration of 
alternative hypotheses, and 3c) address the ultimate legal question more fully.   
4. We expected reports showing less consideration of alternative hypotheses would 4a) be 
more likely to conclude that an insanity defense was not possible, and 4b) be more likely 
to address the ultimate legal question more fully. 
5. Finally, we set out to explore the degree to which variance in these variables could be 
attributed to individual evaluators. 
Method 
Procedure 
In coordination with a state department of mental health, we obtained a copy of every 
capital case insanity report conducted by any specially trained and certified forensic examiner 
within that state from 2004-2009 (N=122 reports).  Thus, we analyzed the entire population of 
reports that met these criteria, rather than a sample.  Insanity reports were chosen due to their 
high referral frequency and the unstructured nature of the task (Melton et al., 2007).   Capital 
cases were chosen due to the high-stakes nature (potential for bias) but also due to their high-
profile nature (incentive to reduce visible bias).  
Blind assistants were hired to code the reports by evaluator and then redacted the reports 
of all identifying information1 (these assistants were not involved in any other aspect of the 
                                                          
1 The names of the evaluator, evaluee, judge overseeing the case, and any collateral sources; all dates (minus the 
year of the report); social security and patient identification number; county in which charges were filed; case 
number, and any other identifying information (including details of the alleged offense).   
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study).  Then two different blind assistants were hired as independent coders to code the redacted 
reports for several variables: (a) what the evaluator concluded (e.g., insanity defense possible or 
not), (b) report length, (c) sources of information, (d) language valence and dominance, (e) 
discussion of alternative hypotheses, and (f) treatment of the “ultimate” legal issue.  Interrater 
reliability ranged from alpha= 0.65 to 1.0 (specifics below; Cronbach, 1951).   
Measures and Descriptive Statistics 
Language valence and dominance.  Language was coded on two dimensions based on 
Bradley and Lang’s (1999) Affective Norms for English Words Instruction Manual and 
Affective Ratings.  Bradley and Lang developed this manual to provide standardized materials 
for researchers studying emotion and attention. Valence was defined as the attractiveness 
(positive valence) or aversiveness (negative valence) of an event, object, or situation (Bradley & 
Lang).  Valence averaged 3.16 (SD= 0.63, range 2-5) on a 5-point scale, 1 (Strongly Likes 
Defendant) to 5 (Strongly Dislikes Defendant). Dominance was defined as having or exerting 
authority or influence of an outcome (Bradley & Lang) and averaged 3.29 (S= 0.63, range 2-5), 1 
(Unassertive) to 5 (Authoritative).  The interrater reliability was α = 0.84 for valence and α = 
0.65 for dominance.  Please see Table 1 for examples of language coded high and low on each of 
the two dimensions.  
 
Table 1. Examples of Language Coded on Valence and Dominance Dimensions 
Valence Dominance 
Positive Negative Low High 
“Provided excellent 
answers” 
“Last suicide attempt was 
2.5 years ago when 
[defendant] tried to strangle 
himself with his hands, 
which would be patently 
ridiculous”  
“This would seem to 
indicate he doesn't 
represent significant 
risk” 
“He will attempt to portray 
himself as having extreme 
memory difficulties, which is 
simply not accurate…he can 
do it even if he acts as if he 
cannot." 
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“Quite responsive and 
polite”  
“He has never had a driver’s 
license but drove anyway” 
"Lie perhaps on the 
cusp of" (intellectual 
ability) 
“He is quite able to appraise 
legal defenses and plan legal 
strategy” 
“Handsome"  “Excessive weight” and 
“exuded bad breath” and 
“was quite flippant” 
"I could not ferret out 
any reason to the 
contrary that..." 
“She will follow attorney 
advice” 
“Has an excellent 
memory” 
"He reports some problems 
with depression ever since 
he got himself into this 
situation" 
“True reliability is 
unclear…he reported 
odd tactile sensations 
not typically 
associated with mental 
illness” 
"He was extremely evasive 
and malingering throughout 
the evaluation." 
"Respectable and 
gentlemanly" 
“Used virtually every kind 
of street drug” 
“He appeared 
motivated to answer 
questions to the best of 
his ability” 
“He has no cognitive 
impairment, so appropriate 
decision-making and judgment 
would have been possible had 
he so chosen” 
“His hair was neatly 
coiffed and he sported 
a light goatee” 
 
“Apparently pays limited 
attention to personal 
hygiene” 
“The accuracy of 
information from the 
defendant has not been 
verified and should be 
viewed cautiously” 
"He demonstrates fully 
reasonable comprehension and 
appears fully capable of 
assuming role of defendant" 
“Appears to be a 
bright articulate 
person” 
"Not surprisingly, his 
account differs from the 
police" 
"He appeared 
indifferent in the 
main" 
“He certainly would have no 
difficulty” 
"He was very polite 
and careful" 
"He would have been 
capable of conforming his 
behavior in an appropriate 
fashion at that time had he 
so chosen" 
“He appears capable 
of appropriate 
behavior in court” 
"He attempts to claim auditory 
and visual hallucinations, 
which are of course not 
credible." 
Note: Valence was defined as the attractiveness (positive valence) or aversiveness (negative 
valence) of an event, object, or situation (Bradley & Lang, 1999).  Dominance was defined as 
having or exerting authority or influence of an outcome (Bradley & Lang).   
 
Evaluator conclusion. The evaluator’s conclusion in the report was coded in response to 
“What did the evaluator conclude (e.g., insanity defense possible?)”  The responses were 0 = Not 
possible and 1 = Possible based on the overall information provided in the report and the 
direction of the examiner’s opinion (regardless of the “ultimate level” of that opinion). Interrater 
reliability was perfect, α = 1.0.  We intended to use the examiner’s conclusion as a dependent 
variable.  However, we found no variability (not a single report supported the components of an 
insanity defense). 
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Report length.  The length of report was counted from the top of the first page to the end 
of the signature block on the last page, and rounded to the nearest ¼ of a page.  Average report 
length was 7.37 pages (SD= 2.06; range 3.25–15.00), interrater reliability α = 0.94. 
Sources of information. Coders were asked three questions.  First, “Did the examiner 
cite sources of information?” 0 = No, 1 = Yes.  Every report cited sources of information, α = 
1.0.  Second, “How many sources?”  The average number of types of sources upon which 
examiners relied was 5.05 (SD = 1.13; range 3 – 8), interrater reliability α = 0.83. 
The next question asked coders to mark from a list of 10 categories any sources used by 
the examiner.  These categories included: (1) clinical interview (100% present); (2) mental status 
examination (100%); (3) records related to the alleged offense (e.g., arrest records, information 
from the attorney, homicide reports, witness statements, investigative narratives, confessions; 
93.4%); (4) national or state criminal index record check, parole/pardon reports, and previous 
indictments (28.7%); (5) prior mental health and/or medical records (27%); (6) current testing 
(25.41%; see Table 2); (7) interviews with attorney (20.5%); (8) interviews with jail staff or law 
enforcement (8.2%); (9) interviews with hospital staff (1.6%); and (10) “other” (e.g., letters from 
alleged defendant, news reports, social security administration records, school records).  
Table 2.  Testing Instruments Used in the Reports  
Instrument Cited # of Reports % 
Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-II (ABAS-II) 6 4.9 
Competency Assessment Instrument (CAI) 61 50.0 
Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with MR (CAST-MR) 2 1.6 
Competence to Waive Miranda Rights (CWM) 8 6.6 
Independent Living Scales (ILS) 3 2.5 
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST) 3 2.5 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) 4 3.3 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) 7 5.7 
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) 1 0.8 
Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) 5 4.1 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – III (WAIS-III) 13 10.7 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – IV (WAIS-IV) 4 3.3 
        “Verbal portion of WAIS-IV” 1 0.8 
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Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – III  1 0.8 
Wide Range Achievement Test – 3 (WRAT-3) 1 0.8 
        “WRAT-3 Reading Scale” 1 0.8 
Wide Range Achievement Test – 4 (WRAT-4) 1 0.8 
        “WRAT-4 Reading Scale” 1 0.8 
“Items from the Hare Psychopathy Checklist – Youth Version” 1 0.8 
  
Discussion of alternative hypotheses. We rated examiners’ explicit consideration of 
alternative hypotheses on a five-point scale.  A rating of one corresponded with no indication of 
considering alternatives – only evidence supporting the examiners’ conclusion was presented.  A 
rating of two was given when disconfirming information was included but not identified as such 
and was not incorporated into their opinion or understanding of the case.  Threes were assigned 
to reports in which examiners included evidence that could possibly disconfirm their opinion and 
when it was identified as potentially disconfirming, but where examiners did not adequately 
explain or incorporate the information.  A rating of four was provided when disconfirming 
information was included, was identified as such, and was effectively incorporated into the 
examiner’s understanding of the case.  A rating of five was given when disconfirming 
information was included and was offered as a viable alternative to the examiner’s opinion, 
leaving the reader with two scenarios to consider.  The average rating on this dimension was 2.72 
(SD = 1.02; range 1-4), interrater reliability α = 0.91.   
Ultimate legal issue. Level of opinion provision was coded based on Fulero and Finkel’s 
(1991) three levels of ultimate opinion.  The first level in this scheme is diagnostic information 
only, with testimony about a patient’s existing mental disorder or about the absence of a mental 
disorder relevant to the insanity issue but no further information. The second level is penultimate 
issue testimony, in which the expert ties diagnosis to the legally-relevant behavior.  Experts 
testifying at this penultimate level use the language of the criminal responsibility statute, but they 
do not give a categorical opinion about sanity.  The highest level, ultimate issue testimony, 
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includes a diagnosis, the expert tying that diagnosis to the legally-relevant behavior, and issuing 
a categorical opinion about “sanity” or “insanity” at the time of the crime.  The examiners in our 
sample averaged 2.36 (SD = 0.52; range 1-3), where 35.2% provided an ultimate opinion and 
56.6% provided a penultimate opinion.  The interrater reliability ratings were high at α = .92. 
Results 
Hypothesized Correlations  
One-tailed bivariate correlations were conducted to examine the expected relations 
between the variables as described above.  We used the probability values for one-tailed tests 
because we made directional predictions in our a priori hypotheses. 
Most of the elements of Hypothesis 1 were supported. As predicted, reports with higher 
rates of emotional words or phrases were shorter.  Specifically, reports with stronger unpleasant 
valence ratings and those with more dominant language were shorter, r= -0.24, p= 0.005 and r= -
0.23, p= 0.005.  And language was related to consideration of alternatives: both unpleasant 
valence and dominant language were associated with fewer alternate hypotheses, r= -0.17, p= 
0.035 and r= -0.27, p= 0.002.  The hypothesized relation between language and ultimate opinion 
was partially supported.  More unpleasant valence ratings were associated with higher ultimate 
opinion provision, r = 0.17, p = 0.039, though language dominance was not related to level of 
ultimate opinion.  Contrary to the hypothesis, neither the examiner’s conclusion about the 
viability of an insanity defense nor the number of sources on which the examiner relied was 
related to language.   
Hypothesis 2 was mostly supported.  As expected, report length was positively correlated 
with number of sources relied upon by the examiner (r = 0.49, p < 0.001).  Report length was 
also correlated with consideration of alternative hypotheses: reports with greater consideration of 
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alternatives were longer than those with less consideration of alternatives (r = 0.56, p < 0.001).  
However, report length was not associated with the examiner’s conclusion in the case nor with 
level of ultimate opinion.   
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported: reports citing fewer sources of information showed 
less consideration of alternative hypotheses, (r = 0.40, p < 0.001).  However, level of ultimate 
opinion was not related to number of sources used. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, there was no 
relation between consideration of alternative hypotheses and level of addressing the ultimate 
legal question.  Hypothesis 5, an exploratory hypothesis about how much variance in each of 
these variables could be attributed to individual evaluators, is presented next. 
Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM).  Because these evaluations were completed by 14 
individual evaluators, it was possible to divide the amount of variance due to evaluators in the 
continuous variables of interest by the total amount of variance in the data to determine the 
portion of variance attributable to systematic differences between evaluators.  In other words, 
some variance is attributable to the individual evaluators, as opposed to true differences between 
defendants, and can be estimated via HLM.  The amount of variance attributable to examiners 
was divided by the total amount of variance in the model (e.g., variance attributable to examiners 
plus residual variance).  This proportion is termed an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), and 
when used in this way is interpreted as the proportion of variance in the set of scores attributable 
to evaluator differences.  Evaluator differences (ICCs) accounting for more than 15% of the 
variance in any outcome variable is generally meaningful (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
We specified unconditional random effects HLMs to allow for the outcome variables 
from the same evaluator to be correlated. Random effects models are appropriate when findings 
are intended to generalize to all forensic evaluators instead of just those in dataset used.  
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Although the number of evaluations in the sample varied by evaluator (ranging from 1 to 34 
evaluations per evaluator), HLM does not assume equal group or nest size and can accommodate 
these differences (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).     
We examined variability attributable to individual evaluators in five variables: language, 
number of sources, length of report, consideration of alternatives, and ultimate issue rating 
(Hypothesis 5). The results were mixed: three of the variables showed systematic evaluator 
differences, but two did not.  No systematic differences in language emerged due to individual 
evaluators, variance estimate< 0.01 (SE< 0.02), Wald Z< 0.49, p> 0.25.  The ICCs ranged from 
0.020 to 0.078, indicating that 2% to 7.8% of the variance in language ratings was attributable to 
differences between the evaluators.  Number of sources was also not related to evaluator, 
variance estimate= 0.21 (SE= 0.20), Wald Z= 1.06, p= 0.29, ICC= 0.155 (15.5% of variance).   
The remaining three outcome variables approached or reached statistical significance and 
are all theoretically and substantively significant.  Evaluator accounted for 38.5% of the variance 
in report length, variance estimate= 1.63 (SE= 0.91), Wald Z= 1.81, p= 0.07, ICC= 0.385.  
Evaluator accounted for 45.1% of the variance in consideration of alternative hypotheses, 
variance estimate= 0.44 (SE= 0.23), Wald Z= 1.88, p= 0.06, ICC= 0.451.  And evaluator 
accounted for a 39% of the variance in level of ultimate issue provision, variance estimate = 0.11 
(SE = 0.06), Wald Z = 1.88, p = 0.06, ICC = 0.390.   
Although large portions of variance were accounted for by some of these variables, the 
statistical significance values are higher than would be expected.  This is likely due to the low 
sample size of evaluators (N = 14) with low power for these tests.  However, these findings are 
worth reporting for at least two reasons.  The first is because this portion of the paper is 
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explicitly exploratory.  Second, the fact that such large portions of variance in these variables is 
attributable to individual evaluators can be a valuable basis for future studies to build upon.   
Discussion 
We developed and tested potential methods for measuring forensic mental health 
examiners’ behaviors in written forensic reports, and investigated the systematic ways in which 
these behaviors relate to one another and are attributable to individual evaluators. These findings 
build on and extend the literature in several important ways.  Some of these measures seemed to 
work reasonably well (e.g., coding for evaluator conclusion, length of report, sources of 
information, consideration of disconfirmatory evidence, ultimate legal issue), whereas others 
require refinement in future work (i.e., coding of language dimensions).    
We hypothesized specific relations would emerge between the variables of interest. 
Correlations emerged in the expected directions between language with report length, discussion 
of alternative hypotheses, and ultimate opinion provision, and between length of report with 
number of sources used and discussion of alternative hypotheses.  Reports that used fewer 
sources showed less consideration of alternative hypotheses. Further, examiners accounted for 
substantial portions of the variance several of the variables of interest (38.5% in report length, 
45.1% in discussion of alternative hypotheses, 39% in level of ultimate issue provision, 15.5% in 
number of sources used). These findings are theoretically and practically meaningful.   
These findings suggest these variables might be used as proxies for potential bias in 
reports; however, the link between these constellations of variables and potential “bias” remains 
an issue in need of further study. Several problems associated with using these variables as 
proxies of bias presented in this data.  The challenges associated with interpreting report length is 
a good example – shorter length could be an indicator of bias or it could be an indicator of a 
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focused report on just one forensic issue that does not address other issues.  Reports can be 
longer or shorter based on other factors unrelated to bias, such as a short or long mental health 
history or limited or extensive symptoms.   
The problem with linking these behaviors to potential bias is due to the naturalistic nature 
of our data.  Because these are real reports from real cases, we had no experimental control.  As 
such, we can only measure and document the outputs – we cannot know what the input variables 
or values were that gave rise to the outputs, and thus cannot mathematically model the degree to 
which “bias” is driving the outputs.  Future experimental work is needed to maintain control over 
the inputs in order to model and better understand how forensic psychologists’ behaviors and 
decisions are affected by bias.  Although we cannot infer bias in our data due to the naturalistic 
nature of our sample, the methodological contributions of this paper in terms of defining and 
exploring ways of systematically measuring output variables (the behaviors of interest) remain 
viable and valuable for future experimental work to build upon.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The lack of variance in insanity defense conclusions was a surprise, and does not match 
the base rates of insanity findings provided in the literature (e.g., Cochrane et al., 2001; Murrie & 
Warren, 2005; Warren et al., 1991; Warren et al., 2004).  The established base rate of 
approximately 10% for evaluators’ opinions supportive of insanity (Cochrane et al., 2001; 
Murrie & Warren, 2005; Warren et al., 1991; 2004) was not replicated in the 0% base rate of this 
sample.  Individual clinicians’ base rates supporting insanity typically fall in the 5% to 25% 
range (Murrie and Warren, 2005).  The base rate for individual examiners in this sample was 0%.   
Two explanations for this finding are offered here.  First, our sample of examiners was 
court-ordered to do these evaluations.  While these evaluators were considered to be neutral 
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rather than associated with adversarial party, they were state employees paid by the department 
of mental health.  Perhaps seeking reports conducted by evaluators hired directly by defense and 
prosecuting attorneys would evidence greater variability in opinions reached.   
An alternative explanation for this 0% insanity-supportive opinion result may be due to 
the fact that these reports were specific to capital cases.  The base rate of insanity-supportive 
opinions in capital cases is not known, and may be lower than the 10% rate in all types of cases.  
In an informal discussion of these results with forensic evaluators involved in these cases, a few 
psychologists discussed the unique pressure placed on attorneys in capital cases.  These 
evaluators suggested that attorneys may be more likely to refer defendants for an insanity 
evaluation in capital cases, even when an insanity defense is unlikely, to ensure they cover all 
possible strategies.  Having a lower bar for insanity referrals in capital cases makes sense: it 
reduces the chances of an ineffective assistance of counsel appeal filing if the evaluation was 
completed.  Thus, it is possible that fewer legitimate insanity referrals are made in capital cases, 
and that the base rate of insanity-supportive opinions reached might be significantly lower in 
capital cases.  Future research should investigate the rate of insanity-supportive opinions in 
capital cases from a variety of referral sources to clarify the answers to these questions.   
 An important goal for future studies examining actual reports is to procure a sample with 
more variability for analysis.  One of our “variables” of interest evidenced no variability (insanity 
conclusion).  And low power for the HLM analyses precluded several models from reaching 
statistical significance, despite the large effect sizes.  Future researchers should garner larger 
samples of reports and individual evaluators, as well as a more varied sample of reports – ideally 
from multiple referral sources and not specific to capital cases – to replicate and extend these results. 
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The interrater reliability ratings for the language variables were lower than the other 
variables we indexed (valence α = .83, dominance α = .65).  The lower reliability for these 
language ratings (particularly the dominance ratings) may have introduced more error into the 
analyses than desirable.  Future work in this area should further explore language variables that 
might reliably and validity be measured in written forensic reports. 
Another limitation of this project was that many of the evaluations in our sample were 
combined evaluations, in which the report included a competence to stand trial and an insanity 
component, and sometimes a competence to waive Miranda rights component.  Recent research 
highlights the various problems associated with such an approach to combined reports (Chauhan, 
Warren, Kois, & Wellbeloved-Stone, 2015; Kois, Wellbeloved-Stone, Chauhan, & Warren, 
2017).  Because the focus of this study was on insanity variables, we did not code variables 
related to adjudicative or Miranda waiver competency.  Nevertheless, the report length and other 
variables that we did consider likely was affected by the fact that there was other material in 
some of these reports. Future research should attempt to isolate reports that focus solely on one 
forensic issue. 
Despite the limitations of this novel study, it was valuable for developing and testing these 
new measures of forensic examiner behaviors in mental status evaluations to inform future 
investigations.  It was especially useful for generating hypotheses to be tested in future research by 
uncovering possible ways in which bias may evidence itself in forensic reports and methods for the 
future development of methods for indexing such systematic differences.  Of note, it highlighted the 
significant challenges associated with trying to index “bias” – instead, we focused simply on 
measurable differences between forensic examiner behaviors without attributing those differences to 
bias.  In future work in which bias might be of interest, maintaining experimental control to establish 
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a cleaner link between behaviors and potential bias is needed. We look forward to future work that 
builds on this and other work to better understand bias in forensic mental health evaluations in order 
to develop methods for mitigating such bias. 
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